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Introduction
This paper explores the in ‡uence of population dynamics on relative foreign direct investment (FDI) ‡ows. We contrast China's 1982 mandatory one-child policy decree with India, which initiated a voluntary, but ine¤ective two-child population control program. Viewing the former as the test case and the latter as the control in a natural experiment, we compare macroeconomic data from the two countries post 1982. We …nd that the FDI/GDP ratio has been increasing in both countries but declining in China relative to India. 1 We show these observations to be consistent with a neoclassical adjustment process by replicating them in a two-country and 'rest of the world'(ROW) overlapping generations (OLG) model.
The key mechanism in the analysis arises from di¤erential future population growth rates and, in particular, a sudden, exogenous relative decline in the population growth rate of one of the two countries. As such, in every generation the national savings of the older age-cohort in the country with declining population growth accrues to a signi…cantly smaller younger generation, leading to a comparatively higher capital-labor ratio in that country. This leads to relatively lower capital returns, thereby discouraging FDI ‡ows into that country. Two institutional arrangements are key to this result:
1. Home bias in investment …nancing: in either country investment …nancing needs are …rst satis…ed using domestically generated savings with FDI covering any shortfall. Indeed, emerging markets economies are usually characterized by a shortage of domestic investment capital with FDI partially making up the shortfall.
2. Individual savings rates are una¤ected by fertility: the opportunity to allocate bequest wealth over fewer progeny does not diminish household wealth 1 accumulation, suggesting that other social phenomena have a dominant role to play in the determination of the household savings rate. 2 Indeed, the literature focused on the impact of China's one-child policy on its national savings rate identi…es an enormous increase in China's savings rate following the one-child policy implementation (Choukhmane et al. (2017) ).
Various papers o¤er di¤erent explanations for this savings increase, all of a social nature. Curtis et al. (2015) and Choukhmane (2017) hypothesize that reduced fertility implies fewer children to support parents in their old age, thereby inducing parents to increase their own savings. Wei and Zhang (2011) explain the increased savings rate as a competitive response to the policy-induced sex ratio imbalance: families save more to increase the wealth of their sons in order to enhance their position in the competition for increasingly scarce spouses.
Imrohoroglu and Zhao (2018) emphasize the long-term care insurance traditionally provided by families, and how the one-child policy has decreased the ability of families to provide it.
Parents are thus forced to self-insure and do so by saving more. Other relevant work includes Chamon and Prasad (2010) and Yang et al. (2013) . That the savings rate has increased in China only strengthens the mechanism of this paper. More precisely, the mechanism only requires that any savings decline due to reduced fertility does not exceed the rate at which the capital stock per young worker increases.
If capital adjustment costs are present, a model feature we adopt, the same relative FDI patterns are observed, but over the course of a longer time interval. This does not, however, alter the nature of the essential mechanism in any way. In addition, and consistent with the model's implications, we document that the trajectory of the capital stock growth di¤erences between China and India closely track the di¤erences in their respective population growth 2 See, e.g. Constantinides et al. (2007) .
rates.
This paper is also related to the seminal work of Lucas (1990) which argues that the neoclassical adjustment process (capital ‡owing to its highest rate of return use) fails to explain the relative paucity of foreign direct investment in ‡ows to poor countries from rich ones, compared to ‡ows among rich countries themselves, where "rich"and "poor"refer to countries with high and low capital-labor ratios. 3 While our results are not in contradiction to Lucas (1990) , they do suggest that demographic factors may have important consequences in determining FDI ‡ows.
In summary, the broad message of the paper is two-fold. First, relative population dynamics play a …rst order role in determining relative cross-country FDI ‡ows. Second, accounting for these ‡ow dynamics suggests that the post-1982 macroeconomic observations from India and China are consistent with underlying neoclassical fundamentals.
An outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 documents the relative population dynamics and FDI ‡ows for India and China post China's implementation of its one child policy. Sections 3 and 4 present a parsimonious neoclassical international investment model, the implications of which are shown to replicate the patterns found in the data. Section 5 concludes.
2. Comparative population policies and macroeconomic dynamics in China and India
Comparative population policies and dynamics
The two countries with the largest populations in the world, China and India, o¤er a unique contrast regarding population policy. Both countries initiated public policies to control population growth. In India a two-child birth regulation policy was voluntary and ine¤ective.
In contrast, China's one-child policy was mandatory and e¤ective. 1. In China, an absolute decline in the working population (aged 15-59) began in 2010 and is predicted to continue under all reasonable scenarios. 5 2. With a high degree of con…dence, the working population in India is projected to continue increasing at least until 2030.
3. After 2025, the working-aged population in India is projected to exceed that of China.
Figure 1 clearly demonstrates that China's policy intervention was not only e¤ective almost immediately after implementation, in contrast to India's, but also its e¤ects on population dynamics are expected to persist beyond one generation. 6 The anticipation of these persistent policy e¤ects is crucial for investment decisions because investors are forwardlooking and major investments are typically long-lived. The combination of contemporaneous and expected future e¤ects of the one-child policy on these comparative population dynamics strengthens the impact of the natural experiment. Table 1 presents comparative growth-performance features, such as productivity growth and GDP growth. These were similar in China and India before and, most especially, after the exogenous demographic intervention, a similarity that allows us to plausibly attribute other trend di¤erences between China and India (e.g., relative FDI ‡ows) solely to China's 5 Figure 1 documents a continued increase in China's population for an extended period following the onechild policy initiative. This is due to a gradual increase in policy e¤ectiveness and the gradual elimination of rural exemptions. For the quantity of relevance to the present study, the working population, one would expect a delayed reaction due to schooling and work preparation at least to the age of 16. The model to be proposed captures this decline as occurring in a single 25 year period, which is an artifact of the model's parsimony and the choice of a time interval equivalent to 25 years. 6 The recently introduced (2017) two-children policy in China may alter the anticipated population dynamics in China, depicted in the left panel of Figure 1 , after 2030. Nevertheless, predictions about population dynamics 15 years ahead will not be a¤ected. These predictions are captured later in the time interval bracketed by the vertical dashed lines.
Comparative macroeconomic performance
exogenous demographic intervention.
Both China and India experienced very similar rapid GDP growth in the post implementation period (see the two columns under "g Y " in Table 1 ). 7 Note that labor productivity growth was also similar in China and India both in Period 1, and even more so in Period 2 while increasing in both. 8 The capital stock grew more rapidly in China in the latter period, while the dramatic labor force growth slowdown in China is clearly evident in the "g L "column. 
, where Y is GDP, K is capital, L is labor, and A is labor productivity (K is measured as the value of the capital stock and L as total hours worked). The two columns of Table 1 under "g A ", labor productivity growth, have been calculated using the formula
we have assumed that the capital intensity parameter, = 1=3 in both China and India). 8 The similarities in productivity di¤erences between China and India are also supported by Klenow (2009), and Bollard, Klenow and Sharma (2013) .
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Let g x;t g x;1;t g x;2;t , with country 1 being China and country 2 being India. Figure 2 plots the empirical g L;t (red line with boxes) and g K;t (blue line with circles), and identi…es the date when the one-child policy was implemented (1982) . Solid lines are the HodrickPrescott …ltered series. Shortly after 1982, g L;t assumes negative values which persist (right axis in Figure 2 ), demonstrating that there has been a strong exogenous demographic intervention in China relative to India. A key feature of Figure 2 is the simultaneous reversal of the g L;t and g K;t trajectories.
It supports our hypothesis that China's exogenous demographic intervention has played a substantial role in explaining the di¤erential capital-accumulation dynamics in the two 7 countries post 1982.
The fact that g K;t is positive after 1982 the demographic intervention is not surprising, as g A rose from 0:48% before 1982 to 0:20% after 1982 (see Table 1 ). This rise in g A is not, however, strong enough to mask the impact of di¤erential population growth on capital growth: g K;t , while positive, is in general decline post 1982. While neither country has experienced a monotonic increase in its historical FDI/GDP ratio, the ratio in both is presently quite high, roughly in the range of 3% to 5% (Figure 3 ).
Comparative K/L and FDI dynamics
By comparison, the analogous ratio for the USA in 2017 was a negligible 0.033%.
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We next turn to the relative growth rates, China vs. India, as regards capital per worker (K=L) and FDI as a share of GDP for the period surrounding 1982. These are presented in Figure 5 . After the demographic intervention, the K/L ratio of China grew more rapidly than that of India. During the same period, FDI intensity (measured by FDI as a share of GDP) grew faster in India than in China. In 1990, the intensity of FDI in China was about 30 times larger than that of India, but by 2014, the intensity of FDI in China was less than 2 times that of India. 12 In the remainder of this paper we provide a model to rationalize these observations.
The Model
We construct a parsimonious OLG model of two countries, 1 and 2, and the rest of the world (ROW). We assume that countries 1 and 2 are price takers in international capital markets, where the 'world interest rate', denoted by r , is constant. For simplicity, we elect to focus on FDI ‡ows from ROW to these two countries. Other key simplifying assumptions are:
-Capital ‡ows from ROW to countries 1 and 2, but there are no capital ‡ows between countries 1 and 2.
-The labor force of each country cannot move to the other country.
-There is no international trade in …nal goods.
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None of these assumptions is crucial to the model's implications.
Production
Aggregate domestic production in country i 2 f1; 2g in period t is characterized by the production technology,
where,
and
Subscripts denote the location of productive activity and superscripts denote the investing country. Speci…cally, K allows productivity growth to be either location-speci…c or …rm-speci…c. Factors such as the extent of bureaucracy, infrastructure, political instability, etc., may cause the productivity of a foreign …rm to be location-speci…c. Furthermore, technology transfer (as, e.g., in Holmes, McGrattan and Prescott, 2015) , which we do not explicitly model, could cause productivity to be …rm-speci…c. In each country i, we postulate a large number of identical …rms operating the technologies described by equations (2) and (3).
Based on the assumption of no cross country labor force mobility, and assuming full employment in each country,
where L i;t is the total workforce (population) in country i 2 f1; 2g. We assume that population growth is exogenously given by,
Our production structure is a simpli…ed version of the one in Prescott (2009, 2010) and Holmes et al. (2015) , with some modi…cations to the role of labor in production.
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E¢ cient factor allocation
The representative …rm, i or r, located in country i 2 f1; 2g, is pro…t maximizing in an environment of perfectly-competitive factor markets. Accordingly, factor demands are driven by equating marginal products to factor prices. In addition, since …rm production functions exhibit constant returns to scale and factor ‡ows within a country are frictionless, the competitive equilibrium e¢ ciently allocates factor inputs K
to maximize domestic production (see also Prescott, 2009, 2010) .
The intra-temporal conditions for the e¢ cient allocation of factor inputs,
in order to maximize Y i;t , subject to,
where K i;t is total country i capital and L i;t total country i labor, are,
and,
14 The Prescott (2009, 2010 ) models assume that total population, L i;t , enters the production function of both companies relying on domestic capital and of companies relying on FDI. Using the abstractions and notation of our model, domestic production in a Prescott (2009, 2010) type of model would be,
They motivate their formulation by the observed correlation between population size and FDI-location capacity. The Prescott (2009, 2010) formulation is convenient for obtaining an aggregate Cobb-Douglas domestic-production function. In this paper we suggest company-speci…c Cobb-Douglas production technologies and clearly distinguish those who work in FDI-related companies and those who work in domestically …nanced companies.
Here "MPK" and "MPL" signify the marginal product of capital and marginal product of labor respectively.
Households, domestic savings, and national capital
We use a simple variant of the overlapping-generations (OLG) model developed in Diamond (1965) . Individuals live for two periods. Omitting subscript i, unless necessary, the following notation applies: c 1;t consumption of a young agent born at time t (t speci…es the generation) c 2;t consumption when old at time t + 1 of an individual born at time t L t number of individuals born in period t and working in period t w t competitive wage received in period t r t+1 interest rate paid on savings held from period t to period t + 1.
Aggregate consumption in period t + 1 is thus L t c 2;t + L t+1 c 1;t+1 (see below)
Age born in t c 1;t c 2;t Groups born in t + 1 c 1;t+1 c 2;t+1
We further assume:
1. Within each cohort, individuals are identical. The utility function of a representative individual is given by, U (c 1;t ; c 2;t ) = log (c 1;t ) + log (c 2;t ) , with discount factor 2 (0; 1) . (9) 2. Labor supply is completely inelastic and equal to one unit per period. Accordingly, the labor income of an individual when working in period t is w t .
3. When young, individuals work, consume and accumulate capital (save). When old, individuals rent their capital to …rms (in which the young generation works), consume, and die.
The consumption of generation t, when old (occurring in period t + 1), is thus given by,
where s t denotes period t savings of a household (when young). Since the only source of income when young is the wage income w t , s t = w t c 1;t , and (10) becomes,
Maximizing lifetime utility (9) subject to the lifetime constraint (11) yields,
Aggregate domestic savings of the young generation, S i;t = s i;t L i;t , is equal to aggregate investment, which augments the national capital stock of the country in period t. Equation (12) then implies,
15 Under one additional assumption,
production in both countries i 2 f1; 2g is given by an aggregated domestic production function of the form,
This special case allows the derivation of analytical results with direct empirical implications. Nevertheless, assuming A Although we make assumptions (namely logarithmic preferences) that lead to a constant savings rate, all of our qualitative results and testable implications are preserved if the savings rate is increasing through time. The mechanism on which this paper is based is one where the declining population means that each generation provides the next with higher capital per worker, a fact that discourages/crowds-out FDI ‡ows. 16 An increased savings rate would only reinforce the phenomenon we emphasize. Indeed, from 1980-2010 the household savings rate in China doubled (see, e.g., Imrohoroglu and Zhao, 2018).
Capital adjustment costs
In the absence of any capital adjustment cost, optimal investment is governed by, 15 We also assume that A i i;t = A r i;t because we lack any data on labor productivity growth in foreign owned vs. domestically owned …rms. 16 The expression 'crowding out' implies that the lower capital returns which follow on higher K/L ratios reduce the incentives for foreign …rms to undertake FDI.
With frictionless capital ‡ows and unlimited capital availability at the world cost of capital r , steady state transitions due to underlying parameter changes will occur in one period which, in this model, corresponds to one-half of an adult lifetime. In order to better match the empirical duration of transitions we impose a capital adjustment cost on the dynamics implied by equations (13) and (16). In particular, we modify equation (16) to be of the form:
where > 0, 2 (0; 1). 17 The symbol t > 0 denotes the period in which an exogenous intervention shocks the equilibrium away from its steady-state path. For some periods after a transitional shock there is a loss of (1 ) t t 1 in capital returns, which we postulate as due to some combination of industrial relocation costs and institutional adjustment costs such as bureaucratic frictions. 18 These institutional adjustments are gradually smoothed out, and the capital-returns wedge, (1 ) t t 1 , decays over time at rate .
Equilibrium
Equilibrium is characterized by a set of prices and quantities at which all …rms maximize pro…ts, all households maximize utility as price takers given these equilibrium prices and all 17 Note that equation (17) assumes a constant return on capital worldwide and in the countries under study. A large literature has developed seeking to explain China's high and stable return on capital of around 20% in conjunction with the high savings rate (see Bai et al., 2006, and Song et al. 2011 ). India's return on capital is di¢ cult to estimate since much of it is held in non-…nancial assets. 18 The exogenous wedge that we impose upon condition (16) through equations (17) and (18) is similar to measured wedges that re ‡ect deviations from the covered interest rate parity condition observed by Du, Tepper, and Verdelhan (2017) after the recent …nancial crisis. Du, Tepper, and Verdelhan (2017) attribute these deviations to costs associated with bank regulation. They can be seen as adjustment costs of moving from pre-crisis to post-crisis leverage ratios. For some countries, these covered interest rate parity deviations were stronger during the …nancial crisis crisis and then started fading away over time, as equation (18) implies (Du, Tepper, and Verdelhan, 2017 , Figure 2 ). domestic and international markets clear at these equilibrium prices and quantities.
In the model with adjustment costs, equilibrium in country i 2 f1; 2g is characterized by conditions (13) and (17), with adjustment costs introducing long-lasting transitions in the capital labor ratio. In a steady state, adjustment costs are zero by construction.
In the next sections we study the e¤ects of an exogenous demographic intervention on the equilibrium K/L ratio and FDI. To analyze these e¤ects in detail, we rely on speci…c relationships describing K/L ratio dynamics both along the transition path toward the steady-state growth path, and along the steady state growth path itself. These are presented below:
a) Transition Dynamics
Equation (17) implies,
In turn, equation (19) implies that the growth rates of capital, labor and labor productivity are jointly related according to
From equation (20) we see that an exogenous demographic intervention that reduces population growth from a constant rate g L;i to a lower constant rate g L;i , will also cause a drop in the growth rate of domestic capital, absent changes in labor productivity growth.
b) Steady State Growth Dynamics ( (t; t) = 0)
We maintain our assumption that population growth is constant and further assume that productivity growth is also constant over time in country i 2 f1; 2g, i.e.,
In conjunction with (17) and (18), equation (15) yields,
In Online Appendix B we show that the steady state growth path in economy i is characterized by equations,
and, F DI r i;t
Equation (24) follow. In using these equilibrium relationships we will essentially be exploring transitions between steady states that arise as the result of a fundamental parameter change, a reduction in the population growth rate.
In the next section we replicate the empirical regularities depicted in Section 2 as equilibrium outcomes of the model just detailed when one of the countries experiences a negative shock to its population growth rate.
Model Implications
The goal of this paper is to emphasize the role played by the one-child policy in China in explaining the comparative FDI/GDP dynamics in China and India. Explaining the precise trajectories of the FDI/GDP levels in China and India, especially the very low FDI/GDP levels of the early 1980s, when neither of the two countries were market economies, is a challenge that requires introducing market and trade wedges, something we eschew. Accordingly, we focus on the post 1990 period, when both China and India displayed robust FDI/GDP ratios and almost free access to international markets. For this period the role of demographics in explaining the comparative FDI trajectories in China and India should be transparent.
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In particular, we study a parametrized version of the model where an exogenous demographic intervention occurs in period 10. The length of each period is T = 25. The annual rate of time preference is (1 ) = = 6%. The annual labor productivity growth rate is
, a rough average of the data summarized in Table 1 . For the treated country, the annual population growth rate prior to the intervention is g L = 2%, andg L = 1%
afterwards. For the control country it is 2% throughout. The output elasticity of capital 20 As shown in Table 1 , the productivity di¤erences between China and India have been very small. This similarity allows us to focus on the comparative e¤ects caused by the exogenous intervention in the population growth rate of China. 20 is = 1=3, while the value for the annual world interest rate, r , is set to r = 3%, in accordance with estimates in Holston, Laubach, and Williams (2017) . Following Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997, p. 76) , the annual depreciation rate, , is set to = 3%. The annual wedge on the world capital return is = 0:5%, and the rate of decay of the world-interest rate wedge is = 30%. 
Relative growth in capital and labor
Since India's demographic-control policies were broadly ine¤ective and it was exposed to the same globalization factors as China (especially in the mid-1990s), we postulate that India remained close to its steady-state path, and examine the di¤erence in the capital growth rate between the two countries. In particular, equation (20) can be re-written as,
where g x;t g x;1;t g x;2;t . Identifying country 1 as China and country 2 as India, equation
(26) relates the relative capital stock growth, China vs. India, to the relative labor force and productivity growth rates.
Consistent with the data in Table 1 , we assume g A;t = 0. With g A;t = 0, equation (26) implies a direct positive connection between g L;t and g K;t and o¤ers an identi…cation test: if growth dynamics in China and India are governed by the neoclassical production process assumed in equation (15), then the unique demographic intervention in China (the imposition of the one-child policy, a quasi-natural experiment) should be manifest empirically as a simultaneous reversal of the g K;t and g L;t trajectories post the intervention. Direct empirical evidence identifying this causal reversal, a drop in g K;t caused by an exogenous drop in g L;t , is present in Figure 2 .
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Figure 6 -The e¤ect of demographic intervention on the di¤erence in the capital growth rate for the two economies around the time of the demographic intervention (treatment for one country only).
For the parameter choices above, Figure 6 portrays the indicated corresponding modelgenerated g K;t and g L;t trajectories, prior to and following the noted demographic intervention. 23 Figure 6 con…rms that the theoretical model implications depicted in Figure 6 22 The observed di¤erences in magnitudes between g K;t and g L;t in Figure 2 , can be theoretically attributed to the wedge dynamics in equation (26) and empirically to institutional, cultural or other latent factors. 23 Note that the control country is initially identical to its treated counterpart even with reference to the level of labor productivity.
conform to the empirical observations detailed in Figure 2 .
The impact of an exogenous demographic intervention on relative FDI dynamics
In this section we focus on FDI, speci…cally the trajectories of capital in ‡ows from ROW.
It is assumed that both countries are identical as regards their initial K/L ratio and have identical labor productivity growth rates before and after the intervention.
Using the parameter values detailed in the previous section, Figure 7 depicts modelgenerated di¤erences between one country experiencing an exogenous period-10 demographic intervention, and a country on its steady-state path. Panels A, C and E describe the consequences for the treated country while Panels B, D and F compare its response to the intervention with the corresponding quantity in the control country. (18), adjustment costs of industrial relocation, and 24 To assess the implications of Figure 7 , the reader is again reminded that if we consider two time series, x t and z t , and plot log (x t ) log (z t ) over time, then an upward-sloping log (x t ) log (z t ) implies that x t grows faster than z t . 25 As stressed above, in equation (19), capital in e¢ ciency units, K= (AL), is tied to the world interest rate, r . In order to better understand the dynamics of K/L ratios we need to control for changes in the dynamics of labor productivity, A, which we plot in Panel A of Figure 7 as K= (AL). 26 Following the identi…cation mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the K/L ratio in the treated country grew relative to its equivalent in the control country.
23 institutional adjustments such as bureaucratic frictions are manifested in a temporary drop in capital returns, driven by the capital-returns wedge, (t; t) = (1 ) t t 1 , that decays over time. Our choice of parameter is an annual rate of 0:5%, and the decay parameter = 0:3 implies that the half-life of this interest-rate wedge is about 50 years, which corresponds to two generations of young workers (T=25 years). These values of and reproduce empirically plausible K/L ratio dynamics. 24 Panels E and F detail the consequences of the intervention for the FDI/GDP ratio of the treated country. As evident in equation (25), the steady state FDI/GDP ratio of country i is positively related to its population growth rate g L;i . Accordingly, a reduction in the treated country's g L;i reduces its FDI/GDP ratio, an e¤ect manifested in Panel E. Relative to the control country, its FDI/GDP ratio declines as well (Panel F): although the K/L ratio of the treated country eventually returns to its pre-intervention values (Panel A), the composition of its ownership of its capital stock has changed in favor of proportionately less FDI. We summarize these model implications as follows: a permanent decline in the population growth rate of the treated country leads to, (i) a temporary, though prolonged, increase in the K/L ratio above its steady state value, (ii) a temporary, though prolonged, decrease in the marginal product of capital below its steady state value, and (iii) a permanent reduction in its FDI/GDP ratio both absolutely and relative to its control counterpart. Note that Panel A of Figure 7 depicts the time path of the normalized (by labor productivity, A)
K/L ratio. The K/L ratio of both countries, except on the transition path for the treated country, thus continues to grow at the same growth rate as A.
The permanent decline in the relative FDI/GDP ratio following a permanent reduction in the treated country's population growth rate (Figure 7 , Panel F) is not due to the temporarily lower marginal product of capital ( Figure 7 , Panel D) and thus lower capital returns. We emphasize that it is not the (temporarily) lower capital returns that discourage FDI. Rather, less FDI is needed since greater capital per worker is being inherited from the prior generation due to the reduction in the population growth rate in an environment where the savings rate is unchanged. 27 It is a "crowding-out"type e¤ect. Model dynamics are thus in accord with data ( Figure 5 ). 27 These results are robust to a reduced savings rate response to fewer descendants in a model of implicit voluntary bequests, provided the savings rate decline is not too great.
We present further evidence (Figure 8 Prior to 1992, the FDI/I ratio was low in China and negligible in India. This is evident from Figure 8 . While India's FDI/I ratio is generally increasing in the years following 1992, the pattern for China is one of an initial dramatic increase, followed by a pronounced general decline. A major reason for the initial increase in China's FDI/I ratio is easily identi…ed.
In 1992 the Chinese government formally established "market economy reforms"in its constitution and began to strengthen private property rights by enforcing the "rule of law"for commercial transactions. As a landmark on China's transition to a market economy, these reforms made China a dramatically more attractive place for foreign investment. 28 While the observed decline in China's FDI/I ratio is theoretically consistent with the perspective of this paper -the "crowding out"of FDI by increases in China's K/L due to demographic repression -it may also be due to the dramatic increases in China's domestic household savings rate in this period (see Choukhmane et al. (2017) ), a feature absent in the present model formulation. As noted earlier, however, introducing an increasing savings rate would only strengthen the model's prediction of a declining FDI/I ratio.
In summary, our theoretical predictions are as follows:
1. After a permanent drop in a country's population growth rate its FDI/GDP ratio will steadily decline to a new, permanently lower, level (see Figure 7 , Panel E, and equation (25)).
2. After a permanent drop in a country's population growth rate, its FDI/I ratio will similarly decline to a new, permanently lower, level.
In Figure 8 , China's FDI/I ratio does decline with time, in accordance with the theoretical predictions. In Figure 3 , however, China's FDI/GDP ratio is seen to stabilize at around 4%, a seeming contradiction to the theory presented here.
We attribute this discrepancy to other factors at play, and, in particular, labor productivity growth. Speci…cally, Table 1 portrays a dramatic increase in China's productivity growth in the decades following 1982. Moreover, equation (25) implies a positive steady-state relationship between the FDI/GDP ratio and labor productivity growth. Taken together, these facts suggest that China's enhanced productivity growth post 1982, per se, would lead to a higher FDI/GDP ratio, and that this e¤ect may overwhelm the opposing force of lower population growth emphasized in the present paper. Accordingly, we hypothesize that the FDI/GDP pattern evident in Figure 3 is the result of the e¤ects of higher productivity growth and lower population growth counterbalancing one another.
Nevertheless, the fact that productivity growth was similar in China and India after 1982 allows us also to focus on comparative FDI/GDP dynamics between China and India. On Figure 4 we have focused on these comparative FDI/GDP dynamics, empirical observations that are replicated theoretically in Figure 7 (Panel F).
Relationship to the existing literature
The neoclassical foundation for dynamic FDI analysis was …rst articulated in Prescott (2009, 2010) , and Holmes, McGrattan and Prescott (2015) . These three studies introduce international capital ‡ows in a fashion similar to the present model. The paradigms they consider assume that both population growth rates and labor-productivity growth rates are equal across countries (see McGrattan and Prescott, 2010 , p. 1503 , and Holmes, McGrattan and Prescott, 2015 , p. 1172 , an assumption necessary for the existence of steady states in their formulations. 29 In these papers both developed and developing countries have the same population growth, suggesting that developing countries catch up with the world production frontier mainly through capital deepening. Alternatively, the concept of "technology transfer" in McGrattan and Prescott (2009 ), and Holmes, McGrattan and Prescott (2015 represents another appropriate technique for analyzing, e.g., the post-World-War II transition of southern European economies toward the EU frontier.
From a pure demographic perspective, Backus et al. (2014) and Cooley and Henriksen (2018) of di¤ering population dynamics (life expectancies, population age distributions) for capital ‡ows between countries. In the latter work the focus is more on the implications of population dynamics for economic growth rates within countries, particularly Japan and the US. The mechanism we have emphasized, however, is not showcased in these papers.
The present paper is also a contribution to the growing literature studying savings and investment in China. Bai et al. (2006) were the …rst to document the high capital returns in China (exceeding 20% post 1993) carefully. They conclude that China's high investment rate is consistent with the observed high returns. Song et al. (2011) explore the seeming contradiction implicit in China's simultaneous high capital returns and high capital out ‡ows.
Their model rests on the internal reallocation of capital out of low growth …rms that are large, externally …nanced, and whose capital needs are low. In contrast, high growth, high productivity …rms are small and subject to capital constraints. They thus …nance their rapidly increasing investments out of internally generated funds alone. As a result, the surplus capital from low growth …rms migrates abroad, while the relative growth in the high productivity …rms allows high overall capital returns to be observed. 30 Nothing in the present model depends on the precise level of capital returns. The large literature that studies the impact of China's one-child policy on its national savings rate was noted in the introduction.
Finally, the ability of the model to replicate the facts depicted in Figure 3 does not contradict the Lucas paradox per se: FDI/GDP and K/L were higher in China compared to India throughout the entire sample period. 31 It does suggest, however, that the search 30 A more recent study also reporting high capital returns in China and focusing on the link between these returns and the housing boom in China, is Chen and Wen (2017) . 31 The present model is also able to replicate the Lucas (1990) paradox as a potential competitive equilibrium outcome. To see this, …rst note that by equation (24), the level of labor productivity, A i , in ‡uences the K/L ratio. By equation (25), however, the level of labor productivity has no in ‡uence on the steady state FDI/GDP ratio. Imagine two countries, one with a lower i , a higher level of capital intensity i , and higher labor force and labor productivity growth rate. By equation (25) this country will have the higher steady-state FDI/GDP ratio (r and being common to both countries). If this country simultaneously enjoys labor productivity A i dramatically above its counterpart, this high FDI/GDP ratio country will also for neoclassical fundamentals underlying FDI ‡ows may be more productively undertaken by exploring cross-country relative rather than absolute FDI dynamics. 32
Conclusion
This paper is a contribution to the nascent literature on the role of FDI and technology transfer in international markets in the context of integrated capital markets (see Prescott, (2009, 2010) , and Holmes, McGrattan and Prescott, (2015) ). We emphasize the e¤ects of cross-country heterogeneity in population growth on relative FDI ‡ows, a topic not previously addressed in that literature. More speci…cally, the mandatory one-child policy in China is contrasted with India's comparatively laissez faire approach as a natural experiment to test for the presence of neoclassical FDI dynamics. Our evidence and analysis support the hypothesis that neoclassical fundamentals do govern relative FDI ‡ows.
As in the literature cited above, we employ a straightforward OLG construct for our analysis, and focus on studying temporary, though prolonged departures from steady states.
For emerging markets, real-world transitional dynamics which are far from the steady state, can be quite complicated, suggesting that the assumption of household perfect foresight may be too strong. The "myopia" (beyond an adult's life span of, e.g., 50-60 years) of an OLG model however, is perhaps the more appropriate starting point for capturing the rules of thumb used by savers in emerging economies.
have a higher (K/L). Accordingly, more capital ‡ows from the ROW to the richer of the two countries, where we measure wealth in terms of capital per worker. This is one version of the Lucas (1990) paradox in our neoclassical setting. In fact, the high FDI/GDP, high A country described above resembles the USA in many respects: a country with a high absolute TFP level, high TFP growth by developed world standards, a high income share to capital and low savings (low ). 32 Notably, this natural experiment could not showcase these mechanics back in 1990, when the Lucas-paradox paper was written.
Online Appendix A -Proof of production aggregation
We omit time subscripts for simplicity. From equations (1), (2), (3), and (14), we obtain,
Assuming frictionless cross-country capital ‡ows, condition (7) implies the equilibrium condition:
Combining equations (28), (2), and (3), we obtain,
Equation (27), combined with (29) and (4) becomes,
Adding the term K 
given (4), and given that
Combining (30) with (31) we obtain
which coincides with equation (15), proving the aggregation result.
33
8. Online Appendix B -Proof of equations (23), (24), and (25) Equation (22) 
Substituting (32) into (15) gives equation (23).
To prove (24), notice that (13) and (15) give,
Substituting (33) into (23) implies,
Dividing both sides of equation (34) 
proving equation (24).
For proving equation (25), observe that equation (22) 
Combining (38) and (39) To address the concern that large-scale internal migration in China would decrease the capital-labor ratio instead of increasing it, we use the urban population, restricted to ages 15-64 and perform a robustness check. Figure A .5 shows that the linear time trend coefficient (of the log K/L ratio of China over the K/L ratio of India) is positive and statistically significant (not equal to 0 with p-value at 0.3%). In Figure A .6 where we plot a similar data series as Figure 5 (in the paper) using this restricted sample, all the quantitative results remain. Log(Diff K/L Ratio Urban Labor Force)
The first two columns of Table A .2 provide the data appearing in Figure A .6 (without the logarithmic conversion of ratios). The last two columns of 
